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Abstract
The accession of Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, and most recently Montenegro, into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization have demonstrated a commitment by NATO to integrate Western
Balkan states to promote security and stability in the region. Considering this, two research
questions have emerged: has NATO enlargement within the Western Balkans promoted security
in the region through the additions of Croatia and Albania as member states? And to what extent
could further NATO enlargement promote an increase of security and cooperation in the Western
Balkans? To answer this first question, the case studies of Albania and Croatia will be evaluated
based on the influence NATO has had in these two countries in the areas of collective defense,
cooperative security, and crisis management. To answer the second research question, this paper
specifically seeks to identify the potential pathways for NATO integration of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia, as they are the two most likely candidates to be
considered for future NATO integration. Ultimately, this paper seeks to identify both the
potential benefits and challenges of these two countries’ accession into NATO based off political
factors and current challenges to their defense structures. Two main findings have emerged in
this paper— first, that during the NATO accession process, political-social norms are less
important than political-military norms, and second, that even if a candidate state meets the basic
requirements for membership, NATO’s decision to pursue enlargement is ultimately political and
based off potential strategic gain.
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Introduction
Since the founding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, the
number of NATO member countries has more than doubled—from its original 12 founding
members to now having a makeup of 29 members. This significant increase in size of the
Alliance is attributed to NATO’s “open door” policy, based on Article 10 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. This article states that any decision taken to invite a country to join the Alliance must be
based on consensus among all member states through the North Atlantic Council, and third states
do not have a say in these negotiations (NATO 2017). The entry of Slovenia (2004), Croatia
(2009), Albania (2009), and most recently Montenegro (2017) into the Alliance have
demonstrated a commitment by NATO to integrate Western Balkan states to promote security
and stability in the region. Currently, three countries—Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Georgia—have publicly declared their aspirations to join
the Alliance.
Considering this, my research questions are as follows: has NATO enlargement within
the Western Balkans promoted security through the additions of Croatia and Albania as member
states? To what extent could further NATO enlargement promote an increase of security and
cooperation in the region? This paper will specifically seek to examine the potential pathways for
NATO integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia, as they are the
two most likely candidates to be considered for future NATO integration. My goal is to identify
both the potential benefits and challenges of these two countries’ accession into NATO, based
off political factors and current challenges to their defense structures. Since two of the tasks
NATO has focused on in the Western Balkans have been defense reform and counter-terrorism,
my thesis is that further enlargement would only stand to aid other Western Balkan states in
building their own national defenses (in line with NATO norms) and contribute to combatting
domestic terrorism threats. Ultimately, this paper is relevant from an EU studies perspective
because these two countries are also potential candidates for the European Union. Their inclusion
into NATO could facilitate an environment conducive to promoting stability and security in the
region, which could in turn, foster economic and social growth, providing a pathway for EU
membership in the future.

Literature Review
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Kenneth Waltz, a scholar who identifies as a “realist” regarding International Relations
theory, makes the assertion that as NATO is first and foremost a treaty made by states, and
therefore, only states can hold it together (2000, 20). He views NATO as being “a means of
maintaining and lengthening America’s grip on the foreign and military policies of European
states” (2000, 20). Therefore, he claims that NATO’s survival and expansion after the Cold War
are more reflective of American power and influence and less reflective of institutions as
multilateral entities. Ultimately, he believes that NATO is a prime example of how a “moribund”
institution can be maintained only through stronger states, like the United States, to serve their
perceived or misperceived interests (Waltz 2000, 20). In regard to NATO enlargement, he argues
that enlargement occurs only when it is in the interests of the most powerful states in the
Alliance, as they are the driving forces in NATO expansion.
In contrast to the theoretical framework of realism, Keohane and Martin argue that
realism cannot fully explain the success of institutions in creating norms and upholding shared
values. They argue that “institutions change as a result of human action, and the changes in
expectations and processes that result can exert profound effects on state behavior” (Keohane
and Martin 1995, 46). Therefore, institutions are created by states because of their effects on
state behavior (Keohane and Martin 1995, 46). This institutionalist perspective can also be
applied to the analysis of security organizations, like that of NATO. They argue that “the stable
norms and rules of NATO led to stability in levels of conventional forces within the regime that
cannot be explained by structural theories” (Keohane and Martin 1995, 49). According to this
logic, then, the continued existence and expansion of NATO is more attributed to member states
upholding values and norms rather than simply being a product of more powerful member states
exerting their power to either promote or prevent enlargement.
In a piece entitled “Puzzles of EU and NATO Accession of Post-Communist Countries”,
Katchanovski analyzes the “puzzles” behind which countries are offered accession or the
prospect of membership into these two inter-governmental organizations. Using statistical
analyses of European post-communist states, he examines which factors determine whether or
not a state is eligible to become a member state of either the European Union or NATO.
Ultimately, he looks at three criteria which are arguably the most influential factors: the level of
democracy in candidate countries; the cultural affinity of these post-communist countries with
Western countries; and either the level of prejudice towards NATO due to a former influence of
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the Soviet Union or the prevalence of close ties to Russia today (Katchanovski 2011, 305-306).
While he argues that there are overlaps between both the European Union and NATO’s
accession requirements—specifically those concerning political stability and democratization—
they diverge in that the European Union is more focused on social and economic stability, while
NATO is more focused on military capabilities and potential contributions that a candidate
country could make to increase the Alliance’s security (Katchanovski 2011, 316).
In a Congressional Research Service report entitled “NATO Enlargement: Albania,
Croatia, and Future Possible Candidates”, the authors use the case studies of Albania and Croatia
to determine how NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans has promoted security and
stability in the region since their accession into the Alliance. They evaluate the two countries
based off the following criteria: domestic reforms; public support for NATO membership;
defense reforms and an ability to contribute to allied missions; and regional issues (Morelli et al
2009, 6). Additionally, they examine other factors, like enlargement costs and U.S. policies, that
have heavily influenced the prospects of future NATO enlargement. Because all NATO member
states must approve new members, NATO must collectively agree that new additions are of
strategic importance to the Alliance. This means that they do not want to support the
incorporation of new members if they do not believe the new additions will be politically and
militarily advantageous in promoting security, due to the high costs of enlargement (Morelli et al
2009, 13). Furthermore, U.S. support for NATO enlargement is highly dependent upon the
current presidential administration and its policies. Because the United States plays such a
fundamental role in influencing NATO’s political objectives, due to its status as a founding
member and the largest contributor to the Alliance, the official U.S. stance on future enlargement
is be a key determining factor in whether or not accession of Western Balkans states will occur
(Morelli et al 2009, 13).
Gülnur Abyet’s piece entitled “NATO Conditionality in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
focuses specifically on the progress Bosnia and Herzegovina has made towards defense reform
over the years with the goal of becoming a NATO member state, but also addresses the
challenges that the country continues to face which impact their potential candidacy. He points
out that previously, NATO and the European Union required state transformation rather than
state-building from candidate countries; however, in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, both
state transformation and state-building must occur simultaneously (Abyet 2010, 21). He
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highlights the significance of the Dayton Accords as laying the framework for peace in Bosnia,
as this peace agreement serves as the state’s constitution and framework for government (Abyet
2010, 22). Due to the nature of the Accords, Bosnia is fragmented into three ethnic groups,
which interferes with the progression of state-building at the domestic level (Abyet 2010, 22).
Therefore, when international organizations like NATO seek to engage with the Bosnian
government in order to incentivize them to adhere to specific norms, they must actually work
with ethnic-based groups rather than solely state-level groups (Abyet 2010, 25). While this has
been problematic from an EU-accession perspective, Bosnia has still been able to oversee
defense reform in line with NATO standards (Abyet 2010, 25). Ultimately, Abyet argues that
while a “socialization” process (in line with EU accession standards) has not yet been successful
overall, a “technocratic rationalization”—referring to Bosnia’s national defense reform—has
been successful (in line with NATO accession standards).
In a piece entitled “The Study of Things Military in the Republic of Macedonia (19912015): Flying in Place”, Vankovska and Taneseka focus on the military development of the
Republic of Macedonia over the past two decades. Specifically, they focus on the “triad” of
security, democracy, and the military, and seek to explain how these three areas have developed
simultaneously in Macedonia. As Macedonia was de-militarized in 1992 after it gained
independence from Yugoslavia, the country had to completely rebuild its military—no easy feat
for such a small country with little infrastructure (Vankovska and Taneseka 2017, 383).
Vankovska and Taneseka argue that since Macedonia has made it very clear that they seek
accession to both NATO and the European Union in the future, Macedonia’s strategy should be
to focus on meeting all the requirements for NATO membership, as the peace and well-being of
the country will be guaranteed by default as a NATO member (392). This increase in stability
will, in turn, allow Macedonia to focus on meeting the EU accession requirements, and therefore
give them increased prospects of joining the European Union.

Methods and Hypotheses
To determine how NATO has been influential in promoting security in the Western
Balkans, I will first look at two case studies of Albania and Croatia, as they are the two NATO
members in the Western Balkans that have been part of the Alliance since 2009. While
Montenegro is also a NATO member, it only joined the Alliance this past year (in 2017), so it
would be difficult to look at the progression of Montenegro’s contributions or evolving
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participation in NATO operations. Through these two case studies, I will be looking to evaluate
the role that NATO has had in promoting collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis
management in the Western Balkans region through the member states of Albania and Croatia.
Additionally, I will be looking at two case studies of the two countries that are considered
most likely to become the newest additions to NATO—Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Republic of Macedonia. While NATO has an overall framework for conditions applicant states
must meet to become a member, much like the European Union’s acquis communautaire, there
are other, more technical and political requirements that applicant countries must meet as well.
Considering this, it is difficult to measure these countries’ applications for NATO accession
empirically because the same requirements do not apply to all applicants, but are instead specific
to each country. Therefore, these two case studies will be primarily focused on identifying the
current challenges these two countries face as obstacles to NATO accession.
To provide a comprehensive analysis of future challenges to NATO enlargement in the
Western Balkans, it is also necessary to examine the role that Russia plays in the Western
Balkans. As Russia seeks to actively counter the increase of NATO’s power or territorial control
in Europe, they have been instrumental in undermining NATO’s enlargement efforts in the
region. Specifically, I will identify Russia’s links to undermine NATO’s role in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro to illustrate the threat that Russia poses to further NATO
expansion in the Western Balkans.
Ultimately, I have two hypotheses that this paper will seek to either prove or disprove.
The first hypothesis is that during the NATO accession process, political-social norms are less
important than political-military norms, marking the key difference between accession into the
European Union in contrast to accession into NATO. By this, I contend that NATO is less
concerned with accession requirements related to social issues than the EU and is instead more
concerned about the potential strategic benefits that the Alliance gains through extending
membership to a candidate country, as evidenced by the case of Turkish membership. My second
hypothesis is that even if a candidate state meets the basic requirements for membership,
NATO’s decision to pursue enlargement is ultimately political and based off potential strategic
gain. While this decision is typically shaped by more powerful NATO member states who stand
to have more influence, the structural nature of NATO allows for all Allies to exercise influence
out of their own national interests because NATO decisions are always reached by consensus.
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Background
NATO operations in the Western Balkans
In response to the violent conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO launched its first
major crisis response operation using air strikes in 1995. NATO intervention in the conflict
drove the warring parties to negotiate a peace agreement struck through American and European
mediators in the United States, which was called the Dayton Accords (NATO 2017a). In the
aftermath of the crisis, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) were deployed in Bosnia to enforce the cease-fire and agreements of the Dayton
Accords, lasting from 1995-2004 (NATO 2017a). Currently, NATO maintains a military
headquarters in Sarajevo that works in tandem with the European Union in the areas of defense
reform and counter-terrorism (NATO 2017a).
In 1999, during the war in Kosovo, NATO once again led an air-strike campaign, lasting
for 78 days, before establishing the peace operation called the Kosovo Force (KFOR) (NATO
2017b). The original objectives of KFOR included: the deterring of renewed conflict;
establishing a secure environment; ensuring public safety and order; demilitarizing the Kosovo
Liberation Army; supporting the international humanitarian efforts; and coordinating with the
international civil presence (NATO 2017b). Today, the primary goals of this operation are
focused on maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo to promote stability in the
region. Ultimately, since 1995, NATO has been instrumental in the Western Balkans through
these operations—even before the accession of Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro—and the
Alliance has a vested interest in maintaining security and stability in the region.
Partnership for Peace
One of the most valuable tools NATO uses to promote stability across non-NATO
member states is through its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Established in 1994, the PfP
program is based on bilateral cooperation between NATO and a partner country and seeks to
build strengthened security relationships between NATO and non-member countries within the
Euro-Atlantic area (NATO 2017c). While there are a number of countries that take part in the
PfP program who do not intend to become NATO member countries, this program is still used
by some to be the first step towards NATO membership, as seen in the cases of Albania, Croatia,
and Montenegro. Joining the PfP allows for a country to cooperate in a number of areas alongside NATO, while learning how to strengthen their own defense structures and meet the required
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standards for NATO membership. Areas for bilateral cooperation include defense-related work,
defense reform, defense policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training,
military-to-military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster response,
and cooperation on science and environmental issues (NATO 2017c).
Membership for Action Plan
Going beyond the Partnership for Peace program, NATO also utilizes a Membership
Action Plan (MAP), which is specifically intended to provide advice, assistance and support to
countries who have a clear goal of joining the Alliance in the future. NATO focuses on providing
feedback to MAP countries in the areas of political, economic, defense, resource, security, and
legal issues (NATO 2017d). Originally created in 1999 to prepare former Soviet countries for
their accession into NATO, the MAP was also used to prepare Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro
for their membership (NATO 2017d). Today, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have
joined the MAP and are working in cooperation with NATO to ensure that they are meeting the
necessary requirements for membership (NATO 2017d).

Case Studies
Case Study #1: Albania
Albania joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, and officially
became a NATO member in 2009, along with Croatia. While Albania is currently falling behind
every other Alliance member in terms of GDP, it still manages to outspend nearly half of all
members in terms of military spending as a percentage of GDP (Burden 2016, 44). Since
becoming a Partnership for Peace member, Albania has been instrumental in promoting NATOs
key goals of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. After Article 5
regarding collective defense was invoked after the terrorist attacks on September 11th, Albania
contributed over 3,000 troops to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan (Burden 2016, 51). Additionally, Albanian Special Forces have contributed to
NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, and Iraq (Burden 2016, 51).
Concerning cooperative security, Albania has been a valuable member of the Alliance,
due to a history of instability and conflict in the Western Balkans. With the increase in terrorist
activity in Albania in recent years—linked to the recruitment of foreign fighters for radical
Islamist terrorist organizations, arms supplying, financial support for terrorist operations, and the
movement of terrorists through the Western Balkans—Albania’s membership in NATO has been
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essential for providing intelligence and collaborating with the Alliance to mitigate these activities
(Burden 2016, 52-53). For example, after the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015, it was discovered
that most of the firearms used to carry out the attacks were sourced from the Western Balkans,
due to the lack of law enforcement and security mechanisms in place (Burden 2016, 53). In
response, the Albanian military and law enforcement collaborated with Italian security forces to
enforce security in the Western Balkans region. Albania alone deployed over 1,500 security
forces within their own borders to crack down on the illegal movement of weapons through the
country (Burden 2016, 54).
Finally, Albania has proved to be a strong asset to NATO through crisis management.
During the war in Kosovo in 1999, about 375,000 displaced Kosovars traveled to Albania for
help, and Albania worked to set up many refugee shelters throughout the crisis. While this action
taken on the part of Albania was in part driven by Albanians’ shared ethnic ties to Kosovars, it
was also taken because of Albania’s partnership with NATO. Since Albania was a Partnership
for Peace member, and not yet a full NATO member at the time, the country sought to prove its
potential as a valuable member to the Alliance through helping promote stability in the Western
Balkans (Burden 2016, 55).
Case Study #2: Croatia
Croatia joined the Partnership for Peace in 2000 and officially became a NATO member
in 2009. As of 2017, Croatia, too, was contributing more to the Alliance than half of all member
states (NATO 2017e). In line with collective defense, Croatia became an active supporter of
ISAF operations in Afghanistan in 2003, providing a platoon of military police forces to a NATO
base in Kabul (Polak et al 2009, 512). Additionally, in 2005, the Croatian military took part in
the building and training of the Afghan National Police (Polak et al 2009, 512). As part of the
Kosovo Force (KFOR)—a NATO-led international peacekeeping force with the goal of
stabilizing Kosovo in the aftermath of the war—Croatia has been a key actor in providing
support to the operations, due to its proximity to the country. In addition to supplying military
personnel, helicopters, and equipment, it has also provided other levels of support—to include
access to both sea-ports and airports, military facilities, and air space (Polak et al 2009, 513).
Concerning cooperative security, Croatia has created a national security strategy in line
with NATO norms to promote counter-terrorism measures and increase their intelligence
capabilities (Peresin 2013, 11). Similar to Albania, Croatia has had issues relating to terrorism,
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weapons smuggling, and international crime. Through guidance from NATO, Croatia has been
effective in creating its own national security policies to increasingly promote stability in within
its own borders, further contributing to overall security and stability in the Western Balkans
(Peresin 2013, 11). In turn, Croatia’s heightened security measures have allowed them to
contribute valuable intelligence to NATO to promote cooperative security for the Alliance
overall, especially given its geo-political importance as a state in the Western Balkans.
In relation to crisis management, Croatia proved to be a valuable NATO ally during the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to its proximity to the conflict. Between 1992 and 1995,
Croatia accepted more than 500,000 refugees from Bosnia, helping secure the necessary
preconditions for Bosnia to undergo state-building after the war (Kostovic et al 2000, 133).
While Croatia was not a NATO member state at this time, nor was it a part of the Partnership for
Peace, it still saw eventual NATO membership as a goal, and part of its motivation to help with
crisis management in the region is based off this goal (Kostovis et al 2000, 133). Since becoming
a NATO member, Croatia has hosted a series of NATO crisis management exercises, most
notably Exercise CMX09 (Republic of Croatia 2017). Due to its geographic location (being in
the Western Balkans and having a long expanse of coastline) the exercise’s goal was to create a
scenario that would combine the humanitarian aspect of providing aid for refugees while also
providing a framework for natural disaster relief (Republic of Croatia 2017).
Case Study #3: Bosnia and Herzegovina
With the passing of little over two decades since the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Bosnian government has made significant progress in the direction of NATO accession. There
are still, however, key issues that must be resolved before Bosnia can qualify for full NATO
membership. Two of these main issues involve the lack of political support for NATO among
Bosnian citizens based on ethnic divisions and the lack of sufficient defense reform. Due to the
Dayton Accords dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina into two regions—the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina (comprised mostly of ethnic Bosniaks and Croats) and the Republika Srpska
(comprised mostly of ethnic Serbs)—public opinion on political issues has often reflected these
divisions. In 2015, public support for Bosnia’s accession into NATO was at 65% overall, with
82% within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in support, but only 38% of support
within the Republika Srpska (Stiglmayer 2015). Recently, in October of 2017, the Republika
Srpska declared itself to be “militarily neutral”, in an effort to hinder further progress made
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towards NATO membership (“Bosnia’s Serb Region Declares Neutrality in Bid to Block NATO
Membership” 2017). This lack of support for NATO by ethnic Serbs in Bosnia is a direct result
of the NATO air strikes and operations conducted in both Bosnia and Kosovo against Serb-led
forces in the 1990s. Instead of wanting closer ties with NATO for protection and stability,
Bosnian Serbs have closer ties with Russia and Serbia, often aligning their policy goals with that
of Serbia (“Bosnia’s Serb Region Declares Neutrality in Bid to Block NATO Membership”
2017).
The second key issue that Bosnia must address before it can become a NATO member is
the matter of a continued need for structural defense reform. While there have been significant
reforms undertaken by the Bosnian government over the past two decades, NATO stipulates that
the Bosnian government register 63 immovable defense properties as official state properties, so
they can be used by the country’s defense ministry (NATO 2017f). As of 2017, Bosnia had
successfully registered only 23 defense properties under state control, largely due to the
Republika Srpska claiming the property as its own to further stall the Bosnian NATO accession
process (Preljevic 2017). With the recent declaration that the Republika Srpska is “militarily
neutral”, it is not expected that there will be cooperation between the political-ethnic groups
within Bosnia in the near future, and Bosnian accession to NATO is unable to progress further at
this point.
Case Study #4: Macedonia
The Republic of Macedonia initially joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 1995 and
has been active in the Membership Action Plan since 1999 (NATO 2016). Not only has
Macedonia been engaged in substantial political and military reforms to meet NATO
requirements for accession, it has also been a contributor to NATO operations in both
Afghanistan and Kosovo, deploying troops and offering logistical support (NATO 2016).
Currently, Macedonia cooperates with NATO in the areas of civil emergency planning, securityrelated scientific cooperation, and public awareness regarding NATO membership (NATO
2016).
The main obstacle to Macedonian accession into NATO is the Greek-Macedonian dispute
over the official name for Macedonia, which has been on-going for years. After World War II,
Macedonia became part of Yugoslavia, a state with a shared Slavic identity; however,
Macedonia is populated by ethnic Greeks, Bulgarians, and Slavs, with rights to its land being
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contested by Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia (Mavromatidis 2010, 48). Because Greece, too, has a
region of its country with the name Macedonia, that is of significant cultural and historical
importance, Greece is unwilling to acknowledge the Republic of Macedonia with its current
name (Mavromatidis 2010, 48). This has affected the accession of Macedonia into both the
European Union and NATO, as Greece is a member of both organizations and must approve the
accession of new members. At the 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Allies agreed that an
invitation for Macedonia to join NATO would be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable
solution over the name dispute is agreed upon with Greece, demonstrating the readiness of
Macedonia to join NATO having met all other necessary requirements. A potential solution to
this issue would involve the Republic of Macedonia (its official name) becoming a NATO
member under its provisional name (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), in order for
the Greek government to accept their membership (Cooper 2017). While this has yet to be
accomplished, due to domestic issues within Macedonia, Macedonia’s recently-elected
government is pushing for this provisional name change, and it is possible that Macedonia could
move forward in the near future with NATO accession (Cooper 2017).
Because NATO has made known its intentions to welcome Macedonia into the Alliance
as long as all Allies approve its membership, the inability for Macedonia to have already joined
the Alliance has been a direct result of NATO’s structural makeup. While Greece is not
considered to be one of the more powerful NATO Allies, like the United States, France, or the
United Kingdom, it still holds veto power like any other Ally. Greece’s refusal to allow
Macedonia’s accession into both the EU and NATO over a name dispute demonstrates just how
the issue of enlargement can be a highly political issue. Particularly in the case of NATO,
Macedonia has met all the other necessary requirements to become a member, making Greece’s
use of their veto power the only real cause for preventing their accession. This case confirms
Waltz’s realist argument about how NATO is driven by the states which make up the Alliance,
and that it is naïve to believe that NATO still exists and expands based on merely the upholding
of shared values and norms.

Russian Influence in the Western Balkans
An analysis of NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans cannot thoroughly provide an
explanation to predict the potential accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia without
also considering the influence of Russia in the region, which actively seeks to counter NATO
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enlargement. The Russian perception of NATO has always been negative, given the creation of
the Alliance as being a means of countering the rising hegemony of the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. With the enlargement of NATO to include former Soviet Union states, Russia has
become increasingly vocal about how it views NATO’s enlargement and troop deployments near
the Russian border as a form of aggression. Putin’s administration has said that NATO has
presented “new threats to national security which have a complex, interrelated character” and has
accused NATO of “attempting to maintain their dominance in global affairs” by carrying out “a
policy of containment towards Russia” (Farchy 2016). As a result, Russia has maintained a
special interest in the Western Balkans for a number of years. Not only does Russia have a
common cultural and historical background with Orthodox Slavs in the region, but Russia is also
actively pursuing a strategy to dissuade Western Balkans countries from joining NATO to
prevent a further expansion of the Alliance into the Russian “sphere of influence”. Furthermore,
Russia has yet to look past NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999, which was conducted without a
mandate from the UN Security Council (Samorukov 2017).
Russia maintains friendly relations with several Western Balkan countries, most notably
Serbia. As Serbs also make up minorities in other countries, like Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Russian influence in the Western Balkans is seen as a counterweight to the West and NATO.
Russia has made strategic investments in Serbia’s economy, including Russia’s state-owned
Gazprom Neft purchasing a €400 million majority stake in Serbia’s Naftna industrija Srbije in
2008, a Serbian multinational oil and gas company (Bennett 2017). Furthermore, Russia has
fostered military cooperation with Serbia, to include the discounted sale of six MiG-29 fighters,
30 T-72 tanks and 30 BRDM amphibious vehicles in 2016 (Bennett 2017). It is important to
note, however, that despite Russian involvement in Serbia, Serbia has been a member of
NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 2006 and agreed in 2015 to deepen cooperation
with NATO through an Individual Partnership Action Plan (NATO 2017g). Although Serbia has
a policy of military neutrality, its cooperation with both NATO and the Russia can perceived as
“cherry-picking” from both sides in order to maintain its neutrality while still being capable of
being persuaded to foster cooperation with powerful partners.
Over the past several years leading up to Montenegro’s accession to NATO, Russia
became increasingly vocal against their membership. Russia has historically viewed both Serbia
and Montenegro as allies, and therefore, Montenegro’s intentions to join the Alliance have not
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been warmly welcomed by Russia. Montenegro was a part of the Federal Republic of Serbia
during the NATO bombing campaign in 1999 and was also targeted by NATO in order to force
Slobodan Milosevic’s troops out of Kosovo. While many Montenegrins supported Montenegro’s
accession into NATO, the memory of NATO’s bombing campaign in Montenegro caused there
to be a significant opposition to Montenegro’s accession into the Alliance. A poll from 2016
found that 39.5% of the population was in favor of Montenegro’s membership, while 39.7%
were against (Luhn 2017). In October of 2016, on the day of the parliamentary elections in
Montenegro, a group of Russians, Serbians, and Montenegrins were arrested for taking part in an
attempted coup d’état against the Montenegrin government and assassinate Prime Minister Milo
Dukanovic in order to bring a pro-Russian government to power (Reuters 2017). While the
Kremlin has dismissed any accusation regarding their role in the coup d’état, the Montenegrin
government claims otherwise because Russia had previously made known their opposition to
Montenegro joining NATO. After Montenegro’s accession to NATO in 2017, Russia banned
Montenegrin wine and Russian tourism to Montenegro dropped by about 12% as a way to
demonstrate their opposition. The Russian foreign ministry criticized the Montenegrin
government as having “ignored the voice of reason and conscience” and said that Russia
“reserves the right to take steps aimed at defending our interests and national security” (BBC
2017).
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia has begun to increase their influence among Bosnian
Serbs, who have historically been more aligned with Russia than the West or NATO. Because
the Dayton Accords of 1995 ended the war in Bosnia by dividing Bosnian territory among ethnic
lines, this has led to a decrease in integration and increase in separatist sentiments among those
living in Republika Srpska. Russia has increased its backing for the separatist movement through
an increase in cooperation with Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska. Additionally,
in 2016, the Russian media outlet Sputnik News has been highlighting Bosnia’s ties to Russia as
a part of the Russian disinformation campaign. Furthermore, Russia has begun to train and equip
Republika Srpska’s special police forces, deepening their ties to Bosnian Serbs (Cropsey 2017).
The greatest concern is that Russia will continue to further exacerbate the Bosnian government’s
instability along ethnic lines and therefore, make it impossible for Bosnia and Herzegovina to
join NATO in the future.

Analysis and Conclusions
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The findings from these four case studies have supported my two main hypotheses
overall. My first hypothesis was that political-social norms are less important than politicalmilitary norms, when considering requirements for NATO accession. While there is an element
within NATO that seeks to enforce democratic principles within member states’ governments,
NATO is a political-military alliance, and it is more concerned with states’ adherence to
requirements that strengthen military capabilities and preparedness. Unlike the European Union
accession requirements, which have distinct social requirements, NATO is intentionally
ambiguous on these matters, and is less concerned with social issues than defense ones. This can
be seen in the example of Turkey, which is a NATO member due to its strategic importance, but
is not likely to join the European Union anytime soon, due to its back-sliding regarding political
and social reforms. Furthermore, while Bosnia and Herzegovina have a number of political
issues that are problematic, NATO is more concerned with its need to register immovable
defense structures as state property, which is a more technical issue rather than a structural one.
The realization of this, however, is certainly political, as evidenced by the Republika Srpska’s
goal of stalling NATO accession through claiming military neutrality.
My second hypothesis was that even if a candidate state meets the basic requirements for
membership, NATO’s decision to pursue enlargement is ultimately political and based off
potential strategic gain. Albania and Croatia are not large countries with significant military
capabilities like other NATO members, but their efforts in NATO operations, as well as their
geo-strategic importance have proved them to be valuable assets in promoting stability in the
Western Balkans region. It is only logical that NATO would seek to expand its sphere of
influence in the Western Balkans region to further promote security and stability, while also
overseeing necessary defense reforms. Despite this, the decision to accept new members into
NATO is ultimately political, as seen in the case of Greece blocking Macedonian accession due
to the name dispute. Therefore, the structural nature of NATO and states’ ability to have veto
power regarding the accession of potential members plays a significant role in whether or not
enlargement in the Western Balkans will continue in the future.
In the context of broader International Relations theory, the case of enlargement in the
Western Balkans appears to be more aligned with realism, as Waltz argued. While NATO still
upholds shared values and norms, as Institutionalists would argue, the driving force behind
enlargement are the member states themselves. The United States and Europe both have a vested
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interest in the Western Balkans because instability or security threats in this region could directly
impact the security of other European states and therefore affect the Alliance as a whole. U.S.
European Commander General Curtis Scaparrotti has been vocal about the U.S. lacking in their
efforts in the Balkans, stating that “we are not keeping pace with Russia” and that we have
“taken our eye off the area”, exposing the region to an increase in support for Russia (Vandiver
2018). Since both the United States and Europe do not want Russia to gain more of a foothold in
Europe, enlargement in the Western Balkans is largely driven by the security interests of the
member states themselves. While Western Balkan countries have little to contribute to the
Alliance in comparison to other NATO members, due to their small size and lack of resources,
NATO views enlargement to encompass new member states in the Western Balkans as being a
better alternative to there being instability or an anti-western alignment with Russia in the region.
Ultimately, my thesis was that that further enlargement would only stand to aid other Western
Balkan states in building their own national defenses (in line with NATO norms) and contribute
to combatting domestic terrorism threats. While this has proven to be true in the cases of Albania
and Croatia in the areas of collective defense, cooperative security, and crisis management, the
highly political nature of NATO enlargement could prevent success in these areas for Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia until their obstacles to accession are overcome.
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